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Interactive Geometry for Surplus Sharing in Cooperative Games 
1. Introduction 
The need to understand surplus- and cost-sharing rules in cooperative game theory is 
prevalent at both the undergraduate and graduate levels (Moulin, 1988 and 2004). 
However, the rules are generally depicted as raw mathematical problems that entail the 
calculation of a vector of allocations. This paper presents interactive geometrical 
depictions of the rules for games with small numbers of players (the executable program 
in win32 platform is available at http://cc.usu.edu/~'Slklr/teaching/tuganles/tugalne.htIn). 
The program (i) demonstrates how the simplexes associated with a host of characteristic 
functions are "shrunk" to their corresponding cores, (ii) calculates the corresponding 
allocations using the Shapley Value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing 
rules, and (iii) graphically depicts the locations of these allocations in the corresponding 
cores. It is therefore a supplementary tool that can be used to enhance the instruction of 
surplus-sharing rules in either undergraduate- or graduate-level cooperative game theory 
courses. 
The next section discusses the relevant preliminaries of cooperative game theory, 
focusing on derivations of the Shapley Value and nucleolus surplus-sharing algorithms. 
Section 3 discusses the interactive geometry for these rules. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Preliminaries of Cooperative Games 
Let Nbe a set of n players with 2N denoting the corresponding power set of N (i.e., the set 
of all possible coalitions based on N, including the empty and grand coalitions) and 
v : 2 N ~ R denoting a characteristic function that allocates some outcome (e.g., 
coalitional cost or surplus) among each element of2N. An allocation in the grand 
coalition of the n players is represented by x = (x p ... ,x,J. The core of the game (N, v) is 
the set of all allocations that induces each of the n players to rationally join in the 
formation of the grand coalition, i.e., 
core(N, v) = {x: 6;. Xi ~ v(N') for all coalitions N' E 2N }. 
2 
Provided that v generates solely positive values (i.e., surplus as opposed to cost), 
three common types of games are typically considered: 
(i) Additive: for all disjoint coalitions N J J N2 E 2N J v(NJ U N2) = v(NJ) + v(N2) 
(ii) Superadditive: for all disj oint N j , N 2 E 2 N , v( N j U N 2 ) 2:: v( N j ) + v( N 2 ) 
(iii) Convex: for allNj' N 2 E 2 N ,v(Nj U N 2) + v(Nj n N 2) 2:: v(Nj) + v(N2) 
The core for games of type (i) is a singleton, i.e., Xi = v( {i}) for each player i, 
corresponding to the Shapley value. Games of type (iii) guarantee a non-empty core that 
includes the Shapley value. Games of type (ii) are a parent class of types (i) and (iii), but 
unlike types (i) and (ii) the existence of the Shapley value in the core is not ensured. l 
We can represent the marginal contribution of agent i to coalition N' as 
v(N'u{i}) - v(N') where i ~ N'. We have as many as 2iN'i- j such values relative to all 
possible coalitions in 2 N '\ {i} , where IN'I represents the cardinality of coalition N'. An 
allocation obtained by a weighted average of these marginal contributions therefore 
accounts for the "marginality" of this agent. A special set of weights yielding allocations 
Xi = L IN'I!(n- I,N'I-l)![V(N'U{i})_V(N')]' 
N'E2N\ {i} n. 
(1) 
is known as the Shapley value (SV) of game (N, v). 
Calculation of the SV is straight-forward, particularly for games with small numbers 
of players. For example, in the three-player game with coalitional surpluses depicted in 
Table 1, 
X = 2!0! (9 _ 6) + Ill! (5 _ 3) + Ill! (4 - 2) + 0!2! (1- 0) = 2 . 
j 3! 3! 3! 3! 
Similar calculations for players 2 and 3 yield allocations X2 = 3 and X3 = 4, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The nucleolus provides an alternative method of obtaining an allocation x. Begin by 
noting that the net benefit, or "excess" for the members of coalition N' that results from 
I See Moulin (1988) for further details on the relationships between additivity, superadditivity, convexity, 
the core, and the Shapley value. Examples of each of these outcomes for game types (i) - (iii) can be 
shown using the interactive geometry presented in Section 3. 
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joining the grand coalition is given by LiEN,xi - v(N'). Also note that there are 2n 
values of such coalition-wise net benefits associated with forming the grand coalition 
(including the empty and grand coalitions). The basic concept of the nucleolus is to 
choose an allocation x in such a way that the best leximin ordering of these values is 
obtained.2 Here, a leximin ordering w = (i1\ , ... , W m ) of vector w = (WI, ... , W m) is obtained 
by sorting WI, .. . ,wm in ascending order, resulting in WI ~ ... ~ wm . For example, ifw = 
(3,2,1), then w = (1,2,3). Vector w is "leximin preferred" to u if there exists an m' such 
that 
Wm" = um" forall m" = 1, ... ,m' -1 and wm' > um'. (2) 
In other words, w is leximin preferred to u if the smallest element of w is greater than the 
smallest element of u, or they are equal but the second smallest element in w is greater 
than the second smallest elelnent in u, and so on (Maniquet, 2002). 
If we set e( x) = (~ . x · - v(N I)) , which is a 2 n x 1 vector accounting for each 
.L...1EN' I (211 Xl) 
element (i.e., coalition N') in 2N, then the nucleolus, x * , is such that e(x*) is leximin 
preferred to e(x) for any x. To see how the nucleolus is determined, consider the three-
player game with coalitional surpluses depicted in Table 1 (Serrano, 1999). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Following Serrano (1999), begin by considering the "equal-split" vector of surpluses 
x = (14,14,14), where the individual surpluses sum to v(N) = 42. Thus, e(x) = (-12,-
2,8,14,14,14), where the worst-treated coalition is (2,3) with an excess of -12. From an 
egalitarian perspective, it therefore seems to make sense to transfer some of player 1 IS 
surplus to players 2 or 3. Let the transfer occur from player 1 to player 3, resulting in the 
surplus vector z = (4,14,24) and the corresponding excess vector e(z) = (-2,-2,-2,4,14,24). 
By (2) we see that e(x) is leximin preferred to e(z). Through iterative pairwise 
comparisons of each leximin-ordered excess vector, it can then be shown that z is indeed 
the nucleolus for this particular game. Hence, the nucleolus provides an egalitarian 
2 See Moulin (1988) and Serrano (1999) for further details on the nucleolus. 
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solution in terms of the coalition-wise net benefits associated with forming the grand 
coalition. 
The per-capita nucleolus is obtained in the same way as the nucleolus, except that 
LiEN,Xi -v(N') is replaced with LiEN, (X i -v(N'))/ I N'I to account for the cardinality of 
each coalition. We present the pseudocode used to calculate the nucleolus in Section 3.2. 
(The actual C++ source code is available upon request from authors.) 
3. The Interactive Geometry 
For graphical purposes, our interactive program specializes in three-player games. The 
interface, depicted in Figure 1 for the SV, consists of a view which draws a simplex and 
lines representing coalition-wise values of the characteristic function. The user can set the 
values for the characteristic function via a dialog box that appears by clicking the "Set" 
button on the toolbar (discussed further in Section 3.3). The toolbar provides three 
additional buttons to calculate the corresponding SV, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus. 
In the process of determining these surplus-sharing values, the core is also determined by 
"shrinking" the simplex according to the constraints on surpluses for each proper 
coalition. In the case of Figure 1, the core represents 7.4% of the total area of the simplex. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The program is built by C++ with object-oriented capabilities for graphical user 
interface. Fig.2 describes the overall system relations. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
3.1. Construction of the Simplex and Determination of the Core 
To see how the simplex is constructed and the core determined in Figure 1, consider its 
partial construction in Figure 3. In this figure, the simplex is shown from its three-
dimensional perspective with the coordinates of each of its vertices normalized by the 
surplus value of the grand coalition. Recalling from Figure 1 that the allocation for the 
singleton coalition {J} is Xl = 1, or one-ninth of the value of the grand coalition, the area 
5 
denoted A is effectively "cut away" from the simplex. Similarly, based on the allocation 
for the coalition {2,3} ofx2 + X3 = 6, or two-thirds of the value of the grand coalition, the 
area denoted B is also cut away from the simplex. This cutting away process is 
performed for each of the proper coalitions listed in Figure 1 until the simplex has shrunk 
to its core, depicted as the shaded area in Figure 1. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
3.2. Computation of the Surplus-Sharing Values 
As discussed in Section 2, the interactive program computes and graphically depicts the 
SV, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus allocations. Computation of the SV is performed 
using (1). With respect to the nucleolus and per-capita nucleolus, recall that both of these 
surplus-sharing allocations are derived using the same algorithm, except that the latter 
divides the coalitional net benefits by their respective cardinalities. We therefore focus 
solely on the computation of the nucleolus. 
Although the search for the nucleolus involves finding a maxima, gradient-based 
approaches (e.g., the Newton method) are not relevant since the values assigned by the 
leximin ordering are in general non-differentiable. We therefore use the following 
pseudocode to conduct a search in the two-dimensional simplex: 
precision = 0.1 
loop precision ~ 0.001 
loop 0 ~ Xl ~ v(N) 
loop 0 ~ x 2 ~ v(N) -Xl 
"compare" 
X 2 ~ x 2 + precision 
end loop 
Xl ~ Xl + precision 
x 2 ~O 
end loop 
precision ~ precision /10 
end loop 
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where the "compare" command initiates comparisons of the leximin orderings. To sort 
the comparisons, we then employ the following "Bubble Sort" algorithm. 3 
loop swapFlag = true 
swapFlag = false 
loop 1 :::; m':::; m -1 
if wm' > wm'+l then 
swap(wm" Wm'+l) 
swapFlag = true 
end if 
end loop 
end loop 
The sorting procedure enables a straightforward comparison of the leximin ordered 
vectors. 
3.3. Construction and Representation of Characteristic Function 
Characteristic functions are represented by an n-dimensional array of size two for each 
dimension. This is because the power set 2N literary contains 2n elements. If we denote a 
characteristic function by v[i] [j][k] for three-player case, the representation is given by 
identifying 
v(0) == 0 with v[O][O][O], 
v( {I}) with v[l][O][O], 
v( {2,3}) with v[O][l][l], 
v(N) with v[ 1] [1] [1], 
and so on. 
Our pro gram provides two options for specifying the characteristic function. One 
option is to directly set the values of a characteristic function using the Set button. The 
corresponding dialogue box is provided in panel (a) of Figure 4. The other option is to 
select a predetermined characteristic function from the list presented in panel (b) of 
Figure 4. The three main types of games presented in Section 2 (additive, superadditive, 
3The Bubble Sort algorithm is not the most time efficient algorithm. However, given our fixed dimension 
of three-player games, this loss in efficiency is a non-issue. 
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convex) are provided in both symmetric and asymmetric fonns. 4 The Elongated Core 
assigns surpluses of 1 to each of the singleton coalitions {J}, {2}, and {3}, surpluses of2 
to coalitions {J,2} and {J,3}, and a surplus of7 to coalition {2,3}. The Trapezoidal Core 
also assigns surpluses of 1 to each of the singleton coalitions, but then assigns surpluses 
of2 to coalitions {J,3} and {2,3} and 5 to coalition {J,2}. The Wide Core is same as the 
Elongated Core, except that coalition {2,3} is also assigned a surplus of2. The 
Boundary-Intersecting Core sets each of the singleton surpluses in the Wide Core to zero. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
As an example, Figure 5 presents the core and corresponding Shapley value for the 
Elongated Core characteristic function. 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated an interactive program that can be used to supplement 
undergraduate- and graduate-level cooperative game theory courses by graphically 
demonstrating (i) the construction of the core and (ii) the detennination and location of 
the common Shapley value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing 
allocations for games with three players. Because the geometry for the construction of 
the core is common across all cooperative games, the program can conceivably be 
augmented with new surplus-sharing rules as they are introduced in the literature. As a 
result, the program can be thought of as a "one-stop" graphical interface for surplus-
sharing games. 
4 Symmetric( asymmetric) in this context means that individual surpluses assigned to the singleton 
coalitions are equal(unequal). For example, the asymmetric convex characteristic function depicted in 
panel (a) of Figure 4 assigns surpluses of 1,2, and 3 to the singleton coalitions {l}, (2), and (3), 
respectively. 
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Coalition Coalitional S!!illlus 
{I} 1 
{2} 2 
{3} 3 
{1,2} 4 
{1,3 } 5 
{2,3} 6 
{1,2,3} 9 
Table 1. Coalitional Surpluses for Calculating the Shapley Value. 
Coalition Coalitional Sumlus 
{I} 0 
{2} 0 
{3} 0 
{1,2} 20 
{1,3 } 30 
{2,3} 40 
{1,2,3} 42 
Table 2. Coalitional Surpluses for Calculating the Nucleolus. 
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Ready 
X3 
Simplex 
Xl X2 
Value of Grand Coalition: 9.000000 
- Xl = 1.000000 
X2 = 2.000000 
X3 = 3.000000 
- X2 + X3 = 6.000000 
Xl + X3 = 5.000000 
Xl + X2 = ~.OOOOOO 
Core ( 7.4 percent) 
Shapley Value 
(2.00. 3.00. ~.OO ) 
Figure 1. The graphical interface. 
Document Class 
"""'"- Send User's Operation 
Computation 
Pass 
Transformed 
Coordinates 
H. 
View Class 
Drawing 
..... 
Inquire 
Coordinates 
Frame Class 
User Operations 
Figure 2. The overall systems relations. 
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Xl = 119 
---
Figure 3. Partial construction of the core in Figure 1. 
12 
Payoffs for Coalitions 
{1} /1.000000 {2} 12.000000 {3} P OOOOOO 
{2.3} 16.000000 {U} 15.000000 {1.2} 14.000000 
Grand Coalition {1.2.3} 19.000000 
I C':. OK:::1I Cancel 
(a) Defining a characteristic function. 
Example Types of Games 
r Symmetric Additive 
r Asymmetric Additive 
r Symmetric Superadditive 
r Asymmetric Superadditive 
r Symmetric Convex 
r. Asymmetric Convex 
r Elongated Core (Convex) 
r Wide Core (Convex) 
r Boundary-Intersecting Core (Convex) 
r Trapezoidal Core (Convex) 
l 
I.L:::::::.:::QE:::::::::JI Cancel 
(b) Loading predetermined example for characteristic functions 
Figure 4. Interface for the characteristic functions. 
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Simplex 
Xl 
X3 
\ 
X2 
Value of Grand Coalition: 9.000000 
- Xl = 1.000000 
X2 = 1.000000 
X3 = 1.000000 
- X2 + X3 = 7.000000 
Xl + X3 = 2.000000 
Xl + X2 = 2.000000 
Core (13.6 percent] 
Shapley Value 
(1.33. 3.83. 3.83 ] 
Figure 5. The Elongated Core Characteristic Function. 
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